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Hazard analysis addresses hazards that arise in the design, development, manufacturing, 
construction, facilities, transportation, operations and disposal activities associated with 
hardware, software, maintenance, operations and environments. An integrated hazard is an 
event or condition that is caused by or controlled by multiple systems, elements, or 
subsystems. Integrated hazard analysis (IHA) is especially daunting and ambitious for large, 
complex systems such as NASA’s Constellation program which incorporates program, 
systems and element components that impact others (International Space Station, public, 
International Partners, etc.).  An appropriate IHA should identify all hazards, causes, 
controls and verifications used to mitigate the risk of catastrophic loss of crew, vehicle 
and/or mission. Unfortunately, in the current age of increased technology dependence, there 
is the tendency to sometimes overlook the necessary and sufficient qualifications of the 
integrator, that is, the person/team that identifies the parts, analyzes the architectural 
structure, aligns the analysis with the program plan and then communicates/coordinates 
with large and small components, each contributing necessary hardware, software and/or 
information to prevent catastrophic loss.  As viewed from both Challenger and Columbia 
accidents, lack of appropriate communication, management errors and lack of resources 
dedicated to safety were cited as major contributors to these fatalities. From the accident 
reports, it would appear that the organizational impact of managers, integrators and safety 
personnel contributes more significantly to mission success and mission failure than purely 
technological components. If this is so, then organizations who sincerely desire mission 
success must put as much effort in selecting managers and integrators as they do when 
designing the hardware, writing the software code and analyzing competitive proposals. This 
paper will discuss the necessary and sufficient requirements of one of the significant 
contributors to mission success, the IHA integrator. Discussions will be provided to describe 
both the mindset required as well as deleterious assumptions/behaviors to avoid when 
integrating within a large scale system. 
Nomenclature 
CIS = conditional independence statement  
CPD = conditional probability distribution 
DAG = directed acyclic graph  
DRM = design reference mission  
ESMD      =    Exploration Systems Mission Directorate 
FHA         =    Functional Hazard Analysis  
G = a graph of topological dependence structure  
I(.,.|.) = a conditional independence rule  
ISS           =    International Space Station  
IHA          =    Integrated Hazard Analysis  
JPD = joint probability distribution 
NASA      =    National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
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P(), p() = probability distribution ( )xπ|xp  = a conditional probability distribution  
xπ  = parents of node x  
SAVIO     =    Software and Avionics Integration Office 
SE&I = Systems Engineering & Integration   
X, Y = sets of variables 
x, y = instantiated variables 
 
I. Introduction 
 Rapid globalization and pervasive use of new technology are having profound effects on the systems we work 
with and the tasks we do.  Today’s leaders, managers and integrators must adapt quickly from old patterns of 
behavior in order to be effective in today’s complex systems environment1. For example, history has shown the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) that previous spaceflight successes are no guarantee for 
future spaceflight success given the 1986 Challenger and 2003 Columbia Space shuttle disasters. As an initial gut 
response to failure, spacecraft engineers and flight managers may initially want to focus their efforts on building 
better hardware or acquiring more reliable software technologies that enable redundant fault tolerant mechanisms or 
produce more robust algorithms to aid decision making processes in order to reduce or prevent future 
crew/vehicle/mission loss.  Despite these initial gut reactions, engineers and managers would benefit greatly by 
analyzing the true systemic contributors to many accidents, namely, the people, their interactions, and the 
environments (organizational culture, values, mindsets and processes) in which they operate. As viewed from both 
Challenger and Columbia accidents, lack of appropriate communication, management errors and lack of resources 
dedicated to safety were cited as major contributors to both fatalities6.  The lesson here states that despite the 
pervasive use of new technology, the type of people selected and employed to produce the end product are just as, or 
more, important to mission success than mere efforts used to design the hardware, write the software or devise 
operational procedures. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the critical nature of the integrator (a type of leader, 
manager, etc.) within a complex system and to reveal mental and emotional attributes (mindsets) required to achieve 
mission success in today’s evolving organizational climate. 
In order to elucidate various dimensions of this topic, this paper will provide background information on the 
special nature of complex systems, particularly NASA’s Constellation program, as well as explain the evolutionary 
trends that have occurred to produce today’s complex systems and the leaders required to operate within them. An 
analysis of the IHA integrator will be provided from both external and internal perspectives to reveal essential 
human capabilities to strategically lead and tactically manage within the IHA environment. Additionally, discussions 
will be provided to identify necessary or sufficient requirements that a present-day integrator must embody to be 
effective in today’s complex systems environment. Finally, the paper will describe a qualitative emotional 
competence dependency model that can be used by human resource departments in a quantitative evaluation used 
for hiring. 
II. Background 
To fully explain current requirements of the IHA integrator, background will be provided on the evolution of 
organizations, present day complex systems, NASA’s Constellation system-of-systems architecture (as one type of 
complex system), leaders and managers, the function of IHA and IHA integrators, and the subsequent evolution of 
the integrator (one type of leader, manager, etc.) as a response to present day complex systems.  
A. The Evolution of Organizations 
Ever since the 1960’s, large organizations have been evolving in order to compete in an ever changing 
marketplace and global economy. Fundamental infrastructure and philosophical shifts have occurred during this 
time that have forced organizations to evolve, to die, or to become greatly diminished in their effectiveness. The 
current business landscape embodies sweeping changes that include accelerating globalization, massive amounts of 
information and a dearth of leaders with ethics and integrity willing to place the good of the organization above 
personal advantage. It is important to note that these sweeping changes have affected and redefined the underlying 
nature of organizations and the leaders that operate within them. Albert Vicere, Professor of Strategic Leadership at  
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Figure 1. Evolving Organizational Forms7, 9 
Pennsylvania State University’s Smeal College of Business Administration, clearly articulates the two major 
inflection points7 that have driven the emergence of the current “networked economy.” These inflection points are 
globalization and information technology. 
As depicted in Professor Vicere’s evolving organizational forms (figure 1), older organizations in the 1960’s 
were built on the notion of control, that is, controlled structure, controlled hierarchy and controlled resources (this is 
represented by the leftmost large triangle). When the first major inflection point, globalization, began to challenge 
US companies, these large companies could not compete with the faster, more nimble global competitors. In order to 
compete, large US companies evolved to organizational models that were flatter and faster, hence the smaller, flatter 
triangle in figure 1. Another major change that followed globalization was the concept of “core competencies” 
developed and implemented by large organizations in the 1990’s. “Core competencies” aided many companies by 
focusing their organization on those functions that they wanted to do better than anyone else8. As more companies 
bought into the core competency framework, they had to learn to lose a little more control and to subsequently allow 
others to supply operational tasks that were previously done in-house. These tasks generally fell outside of their core 
competencies. This led to an evolved organizational structure that permitted outsourcing arrangements, joint 
ventures and tactical partnerships7. 
The second major inflection point, outlined by Professor Vicere, was the information technology revolution. This 
revolution now enabled companies to work in strategic and tactical partnerships linked by powerful information 
networks7. The infusion of information technology in the workplace (telecommunication networks, e-commerce 
solutions, web-conferencing, etc.) allowed organizations to streamline their businesses in new and creative ways. 
These information technology capabilities allow for tightly coupled partnerships that fundamentally changed the 
nature of organizations. These newer organizational structures require network-enabled employees, that is, 
employees that are required to network through strategic partnerships via information technology infrastructures to 
fulfill organizational obligations. This organizational structure is represented by the shadow pyramid, the single 
triangle surrounded by multiple teams and partnerships (rightmost in figure 1). Employees not only need to master 
their own competency but they must also be able to simultaneously network with multiple sources, organizations, 
partnerships, or teams in order to deliver on organizational commitments.  
The older organizational forms had processes primarily based on control, while the newer, more networked 
organizations rely on processes based on relationships. The distinction between the two cannot be overstated. 
Employees can take their relationships with them to other organizations if the control infrastructure is too confining 
or too lax. Some leaders who were effective in older organizational structures are generally not very effective in 
today’s networked environment. Besides the changed organizational nature from one of control to one of 
relationships, there also exists the need for leaders to function productively and effectively with another aspect of 
current organizations, the uncomfortable nature of today’s complex systems. 
B. Present Day Complex Systems 
As expressed very succinctly by Yaneer Bar-Yam at the New England Complex Systems Institute, “the 
traditional approach to large engineering projects follows the paradigm established by the Manhattan project and the 
Space program10.” This paradigm is embodied in four underlying assumptions. First, projects generally want to  
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Figure 2. Constellation Architecture Concept14 
replace old obsolete systems with new systems by using new technology. Second, the new technology is based upon 
a clear understanding of the basic principles or equations that govern the system. Third, the goal of the project and 
its more specific objectives are clearly understood. And fourth, a design will be developed and implemented that 
will subsequently lead to accomplishing the mission. These underlying assumptions generally accompany 
organizational efforts to build large engineering projects. Many organizations have even adopted formal system 
engineering processes as a way of methodically moving through each phase of a large project. However, several 
present-day organizations, even the ones employing formal system engineering processes, have failed to achieve 
their goals or objectives. Many of these failures are due to a misunderstanding and misapplication of system 
engineering processes. System engineering, like all other tools, is appropriate for certain types of problems. Standard 
system engineering techniques tend to fail when the inherent complexity of the goal, objectives or functions is 
beyond some threshold. Inherent complexity below this threshold appears to allow for the application of standard 
system engineering processes. Inherent complexity at or above this threshold appears to require the use of complex 
system engineering approaches11 or system-of-systems engineering techniques12. This implies that insight and 
discernment are difficult when dealing with complex systems.  
One of the underlying reasons for this difficulty can be expressed by the concept of local spatiotemporal 
causality13. Local spatiotemporal causality is a condition that is amenable to human reasoning, that is, humans find it 
easy to understand causality when the effect is local or close to the cause in either space (distance) or time. 
Conversely, humans have extreme difficulty perceiving or understanding causality when there is distance or a large 
amount of time between the cause and the eventual effect. From an aerospace hazard perspective, this difficultly can 
be seen when a satellite launch system experiences lightning on the launch pad, but the subsequent malfunction to 
some lower level avionics box is not manifest until after the satellite has separated from the launch system, has 
correctly reached stationary orbit and has operating successfully for several days. The causal linkage is not readily 
apparent to most people due to the distance between the cause (lightning on the pad) and the effect (a 
malfunctioning avionics box) in both space and time.  
This difficulty in connecting the causal dots is just one significant difference between standard and complex 
systems. Other differences include the ability to understand indirect and highly nonlinear processes, designing 
systems that permit heteroscedastic control, etc. 
C. NASA Constellation’s System of Systems Architecture  
On January 14, 2004, the President directed NASA to embark on a robust space exploration program that will 
advance the nation’s scientific, security, and economic interests. In support of this vision the United States will: 
 a. Implement a sustained and affordable human and robotic program to explore the solar system and   
   beyond. 
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 b. Extend human presence across the solar system, starting with a human return to the Moon by the year  
   2020, in preparation for human exploration of Mars and other destinations. 
 c. Develop the innovative technologies, knowledge, and infrastructures both to explore and to support   
   decisions about future destinations for human exploration. 
 d. Promote international and commercial participation in exploration to further US scientific, security,   
   and economic interests. 
In response to the US Space Exploration Policy, NASA established the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate 
(ESMD) to develop a constellation of new capabilities, supporting technologies, and foundational research that 
allow for the sustained and affordable exploration of space. The Constellation Program was subsequently established 
within ESMD to oversee the human exploration mission development program. In addition, Congress enacted the 
NASA Authorization Act of 2005, establishing that the Agency "shall establish a program to develop a sustained 
human presence on the Moon, including a robust precursor program, to promote exploration, science, commerce, 
and United States preeminence in space, and as a steppingstone to future exploration of Mars and other 
destinations14." 
The Constellation Program, one example of a present-day complex system, is a tightly coupled program that 
consists of multiple projects that develop, manage, and execute portions of the Constellation human exploration 
mission. No single project is capable of implementing a complete mission. The design reference missions (DRM) 
fall into three general categories: missions to the International Space Station (ISS), missions to the moon, and 
missions to Mars (figure 2). The ISS missions consist of ISS crew rotation missions and cargo delivery missions. 
The lunar missions provide the capability to transport and land humans on the Moon, operate for a limited period on 
the surface, and safely return them to Earth. Lunar missions also allow for exploration of high-interest science sites 
or scouting of future lunar outpost locations. The Mars missions provide the capability to transport and land humans 
on Mars, operate for a limited period on the surface, and safely return them to Earth14. 
There are many management and integration tasks that need to be completed successfully for each Constellation 
mission. Some of these include managing, coordinating and synchronizing multiple schedules, addressing individual 
and systemic risks, incorporating the insertion of new technology into the technical baseline, developing/tailoring 
the system-level architecture, and performing integrated hazard analyses. 
D. Leaders and Managers in Present Day Organizations 
 
As present-day organizations continue to evolve, they tend to require both leaders and managers that work well 
within the cultural or organizational contexts of the time. What is the difference between leaders and managers in 
present-day organizations? According to Warren Bennis and Dan Goldsmith26, “A good manager does things right. 
A leader does the right things.” The essence of their argument has led to the generally-accepted consensus that 
management involves power by position whereas leadership involves power by influence. Despite the consensus, 
there exist differences of opinion between the function of leader and the function of manager. According to Michael 
Maccoby’s book “The Leaders We Need1”, “There is only one irrefutable definition of a leader, and that is someone 
people follow....Leadership always implies a relationship between leader and led, and that relationship exists within 
a context. Leaders who gain followers in one context...may not attract followers in a different context...To 
understand leadership in context, we have to place ourselves within that culture and get inside the heads of the 
people a would-be leader is trying to mobilize.” Maccoby continues by stating, “In the global marketplace of our 
time, the leadership context has changed from that of fifty years ago, when corporate bureaucracies rode along in 
stable, predictable markets. Then, managers were needed to plot a steady course; innovative leaders could be seen as 
disruptive and were often sidelined. Now, in the context of continual change brought about by knowledge workers, 
leadership is needed not only at the top, but also throughout companies. Furthermore, different types of leaders are 
needed to integrate projects and teams of technical professionals working across department and national borders: 
strategic (leaders who communicate a vision with a compelling sense or purpose), operational (leaders who build the 
organization and infuse the energy that transforms visions into results) and network or bridge-building (leaders who 
facilitate the understanding and trust that turns different types of specialists into collaborators). These leadership 
roles are most effectively filled by different types of people in terms of their intellectual skills and personalities. 
Furthermore, these leaders need to understand each other in order to work together1.”  
Generally, the analysis in this paper focuses on one type of leader within the organization, the systems integrator. 
The integrator can be seen (from Maccoby’s perspective) as a bridge-building type of leader who at times need 
strategic, operational and management capabilities to adequately perform the job. Using NASA’s Constellation 
program as one example of a complex system, the authors have tended to infer, throughout the paper, characteristics 
that are true for leaders and managers in general to specific traits found in integrators who perform integrated hazard 
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analyses. To be clear, many of the inferences made in the paper are intended to be general and not succinct 
statements of fact. Further investigation or analysis is needed to ascertain which specific leadership traits or results 
can be definitively mapped to the IHA role.  
E. The Function of Integrated Hazard Analysis and the IHA Assessor 
 
One of the primary functions that must occur across any highly complex endeavor is one aspect of the safety 
analysis process, namely, the development of an informative, beneficial and insightful integrated hazard analysis. 
The goal of IHA is to provide insight into risks and hazards so that program and project managers can mitigate 
possible hazardous behavior from ground equipment, launch assets, space vehicles, astronaut suits and their various 
interactions before catastrophes occur. Hazards, from this perspective, incorporate all conditions that lead to loss of 
crew, loss of vehicle and loss of mission. The IHA process for Constellation, for example, performed at the 
architecture and system level also includes hazards that impact the International Space Station, the public and 
international partners. The iterative IHA process involves documenting inter-system hazards and their causes, 
ensuring that the need for controls necessary for safe integrated operation are properly addressed and documented in 
system or element hazard reports and analyzing the integrated system to ensure coverage and completeness. The 
depth of the IHA is commensurate with the level of detail provided to the program as it matures through each major 
milestone.  
Michael Massie, former contractor Safety Manager for development of the IHA on the International Space 
Station responsible for hazard identification and mitigation and present lead for Constellation’s IHA, has described 
four essential keys to success that all integrators must understand in order to achieve safe results and to prevent from 
being overwhelmed by the enormity of the IHA task15. These four essential elements are 1) define the analysis 
structure, 2) provide a good IHA plan, 3) provide for good and reliable communications and 4) select and utilize the 
right personnel for the job. These elements provide a solid foundation for tackling the hardware, software, 
operations, information flow, team member constituency, politics and their varied interactions that characterize 
present-day complex systems. 
F. The Necessity of Integrator Evolution 
 
Regardless of the requirements levied on integrators in the past, present-day integrators must be able to operate 
in today’s evolved organizational structures (ones based primarily on relationships without absolute control), be able 
to discern and apply appropriate tools commensurate with the level of inherent complexity of the task, be able to 
grasp and recognize local spatiotemporal causality (and know how to mitigate its effects), be able to understand 
large scale architectures, its objectives and challenges, and be able to communicate and work with differing 
mindsets at various levels of an organization in order to accomplish the difficult task of integration. With changes in 
the organizational environment of complex systems, particularly NASA Constellation program, there exists the need 
for integrator personnel to evolve in order to handle the additional and myriad tasks associated with operating within 
today’s complex systems. 
III. Analyzing the Integrated Hazard Analysis Integrator 
If the organizational impact of leaders, managers and safety personnel contribute more significantly5 to mission 
success than purely technological components (hardware, software, operations, etc.), then what competencies or 
capabilities should managers seeking to fill personnel positions look for when evaluating these individuals16. In 
order to analyze required capabilities, we will focus on the role of the system integrator (one type of leader, 
manager, etc.) within the context and function of integrated hazard analysis. Keep in mind that the analysis 
described in this paper, though focused on the integrator role, is applicable to various roles16 that have similar or 
comparable functionality within large scale system contexts. These roles include requirements owners, system 
designers, system analysts, validation and verification engineers, logistics and operations managers, customer 
interface personnel, technical managers, information managers, process engineers and system coordinators. 
The analysis in this paper will uncover personnel behaviors and characteristics from the reports that analyzed 
both Challenger and Columbia accidents from organizational perspectives5,6. The analysis will proceed by digging 
deeper into the psychological, affective and volitional functions of the human brain (using national/international 
experts in comparative human functioning and executive leadership) to extract necessary and sufficient conditions 
that generally characterize leaders and managers that are needed in our present-day complex systems environments. 
As stated earlier, general inferences have been made from leader and manager characteristics to specific traits  
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Figure 3. Constellation’s Integrated Hazard Analysis Structure 
required by integrators who perform integrated hazard analyses. IHA integrators, from this perspective, are seen as a 
type of network or bridge-building leader and manager. The analysis will briefly describe the mindsets and 
behaviors that should be avoided when managers or integrators are working within a large system-of-systems. The 
analysis will conclude with a description of a present day leader that satisfies necessary and sufficient conditions for 
an IHA integrator. 
A.  What is required by an Integrator? 
As discussed earlier, Massie has prescribed the four keys to success that if adopted will lead the integrator of 
hazards to accomplish the enormous task of integrating various systems within a complicated system. These keys 
reveal strategic, operational and organizational lessons learned from previous IHA experiences. Once again, the four 
keys are 1) define the analysis structure, 2) provide a good IHA plan, 3) provide for good and reliable 
communications and 4) select and utilize the right personnel for the job. Despite the brevity of Massie’s approach to 
success, there exists a dynamic operational environment that each integrator will experience differently based on 
personality traits, inborn characteristics, mental biases, expertise and personal disposition. Though no two 
integrators are alike, there exists a common set of diverse tasks that must be balanced, performed and cultivated as 
the IHA end product matures. In short, integration, if done correctly, is hard work.  
On any given day, the function of an IHA integration involves understanding the major parts of the overall 
system (see figure 3 for Constellation IHA), being cognizant of the political, social and environmental factors that 
influence the organizational culture, and having a good grasp on the technical challenges as you influence and lead 
the team toward coherent and cohesive integration. Current day integrators need to acknowledge the importance of 
relationships both individually and collectively. Note that the shadow pyramid structure in figure 1 is very similar to 
Constellation’s IHA structure shown in figure 3. This does not appear to be a coincidence. This similarity reveals the 
importance of one-on-one and collective relationships in order to accomplish integration goals. At times, the 
integrator will have to develop a flexible structure in order to accommodate the insertion of divergent hazard 
analyses. At other times, the integrator will need to be the advocate and the educator, the unyielding boss and the 
accommodating friend, the benefactor and the scapegoat. Integrators need to proclaim their vision with conviction 
while remaining open to criticism. While complying with programmatic requirements, the integrator must also know 
when to push back, particularly when an organization has established self-defeating practices that prohibit safety or 
is moving on a path that leaves the integration goal unattainable. And while the integrator is speaking truth to power 
or presenting results to an independent safety panel or upper management board, he/she must also be cognizant of 
the mental models of others, putting forth much effort not to offend unnecessarily and to protect, when appropriate, 
the psychological makeup of superiors or stakeholders who are in error. 
This last note cannot be overemphasized. Sometimes the boss, the customer or the stakeholder is wrong. 
Sometimes they do not know what they really want. John Gibson, an early pioneer of systems engineering at the 
University of Virginia, wrote a decalog17 where he revealed that “the customer (usually) does not understand the 
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problem.” In these common cases, it is the integrator’s responsibility to work with the customer to help him gain a 
proper understanding of the problem and to select the best solution path. Unfortunately, this is not usually easy. 
B.  What Was Missing in the Past (Challenger and Columbia)? 
Nancy Leveson at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has investigated technical and managerial factors 
that led to both space shuttle Challenger and Columbia losses5. Her research posits that almost identical 
management and organizational factors were identified in both the Rogers Commission18 for Challenger and the 
Columbia Accident Investigation Board report19 for Columbia. Accidents, from her perspective, are better viewed as 
complex processes involving direct and indirect interactions between people, organizational structures, engineering 
activities and physical systems6. The following conditions, in her analysis, are some of the preconditions that led to 
the disasters: performance pressures and program survival fears gradually led to an erosion of rigorous processes; a 
decrease in system safety program priority led to budget cuts in the safety activities that eventually led to a situation 
of (unrecognized) high risk where an accident became almost inevitable; huge barriers against dissenting opinions 
by stating preconceived conclusions based on subjective knowledge and experience, rather than solid data; reliability 
engineering was substituted for safety; the safety information system was ineffective; and hazard analysis, when it 
was performed, was not adequate. 
Given these results, what can be done when making selections of integrators of IHA systems who will promote 
safety while preventing or mitigating these negative conditions? From these findings, it can be deduced that 
integrators should be selected who maintain rigorous processes to ensure safety. Additionally, integrators should 
also establish an environment where dissenting options are encouraged and opinions are backed-up with solid data. 
Integrators are also expected to use appropriate tools for the task at hand as well as protect the infrastructure system 
containing the data by which critical decisions are made. The type of individual that succeeds here is one who learns 
from past mistakes (their own and others), is open for critical feedback, whose ethics and integrity are foundational 
and who strives to improve the communication paths in the organizational both vertically and horizontally. 
C.  Digging Deeper – Ingredients of Superb Job Performance: IQ, Expertise and Emotional Intelligence 
In the previous sections, we analyzed requirements for an IHA integrator from external perspectives, that is, 
from day-to-day functions that any integrator must complete, from strategic, operational and organizational 
perspectives and from analyses of accident reports that uncovered required duties that promote safety.  In this 
section, we will endeavor to dig deeper by analyzing the integrator from an internal perspective, that is, required 
functionality from psychological, affective and volitional dimensions.  The goal of this section is to analyze the 
ingredients of superior job performance for humans that operate in technical, leadership, managerial and 
organizational capacities very similar to what is required when performing IHA integration within a large systems-
of-systems environment. 
In order to have common vocabulary and understanding, we will provide a general overview of human brain 
anatomy and will briefly describe functions associated with specific compartments of the brain. The human brain, 
the most complex organ in any creature on earth, is actually a set of brains working in concert to achieve daily 
functioning. During early development of the central nervous system, the three main portions of the brain are the 
forebrain (the prosencephalon – the forward most portion), the midbrain (the mesencephalon) and the hindbrain (the 
rhombencephalon). When matured, the forebrain separates into the diencephalon (containing the prethalamus, 
thalamus, hypothalamus, subthalamus, epithalamus and pretectum) and the telencephalon or cerebrum (containing 
the cerebral cortex and the basal ganglia). Most of the size of the human brain comes from the cerebral cortex, a 
convoluted layer of neural tissue that covers the surface of the forebrain. The cerebral cortex (and various 
compartments like the neocortex) is categorized into sections that perform certain functions (see figure 4 (a)): the 
frontal lobe – conscious reasoning, making judgments, tempers emotional response, assigns meanings to words; the 
parietal lobe – sensation, perception, integration of sensory information, manipulation of objects; the temporal lobe 
– hearing ability, language; occipital lobe – vision20.  As compared to other mammals, humans tend to have 
expanded frontal lobes which are involved in executive functions such as self-control, planning, reasoning, and 
abstract thought. In humans, the cerebrum surrounds older parts of the brain such as the midbrain. The limbic system 
(see figure 4 (b)) is a complex set of structures that lie on both sides and underneath the thalamus, just under the 
cerebrum.  It includes the hypothalamus, the hippocampus, the amygdala, among other areas.  The limbic system is 
also the source of our fight versus flight reaction. It appears to be primarily responsible for our emotional life, and 
has a lot to do with the formation of memories.  Limbic, olfactory, and motor systems project fibers from the 
cerebrum to the brainstem and spinal cord. Cognitive and volitive systems project fibers from the cerebrum to the 
thalamus and to specific regions of the midbrain. The neural connections between the cerebrum and the midbrain 
facilitate complex behaviors such as social interactions, learning, working memory, speech and language. 
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(A)  The Cerebral Cortex20 (Head - Thought)                 (B) The Limbic System21 (Heart-Emotions) 
 
Figure 4. The Human Brain: Head Versus Heart 
The reason for describing functional areas of the brain is to underscore two central areas of primary concern in 
this analysis – the cerebral cortex and the limbic system. The cerebral cortex, particularly the frontal lobe, is seen as 
the area that allows for conscious thought and helps in making decisions. In olden days, this area has been called 
“the head.” In like manner, the limbic system is seen as the seat of emotions, responsible for emotional life. Because 
of its proximity to the brain stem and spinal cord, it has a much more immediate impact on the physical human heart 
that pumps blood throughout the body. In olden days, people would mistake the human heart as the primary area of 
emotions and passions not realizing that the heart was only responding to neural signals it received from various 
areas of the brain, primarily midbrain (the limbic system) and the hindbrain (brainstem). In this analysis, we will 
characterize the limbic system as “the heart,” the true seat of emotions. With this basic understanding, we will 
endeavor to analyze the human brain and its interactions with the environment using national/international experts in 
comparative human functioning and executive leadership to extract necessary and sufficient conditions that 
characterize integrators (a type of leader, manager, etc.) that are needed in our present-day complex systems 
environments.  
 
1. Necessary but not Sufficient Requirements: Cognitive Ability (IQ) 
 
Cognitive abilities are brain-based skills and mental processes that are needed to carry out tasks. Cognitive 
abilities are believed to function like muscles, that is, if they are not used regularly, your cognitive abilities will 
atrophy over time. In the past, standardized tests were developed to measure how much intelligence was embodied 
by each person as a way of determining top performers in industry and government. The intelligence quotient or IQ 
was the standard by which intelligence and superior job performance was measured for a number of decades even 
though it has had dissenters that argued its validity. IQ, in general, is associated with the cerebral cortex (figure 4 
(a)), particularly the prefrontal cortex4, but was believed to be something unchangeable in the human brain. In the 
1950’s and 1960’s, personality tests in addition to IQ were seen as major ingredients for job excellence. Current 
research has overturned much of the thinking of IQ as the primary means of identifying top performers. Some 
studies have shown that IQ contributes at most 20 percent to the factors that determine life success22. Brain 
development studies at the National Institute of Mental Health have recently suggested that experience and 
environmental cues may play a very important role in shaping intelligence23. Daniel Goleman, a pioneer in 
analyzing emotional intelligence, has provided much insight explaining the limits of IQ. In his book, Working With 
Emotional Intelligence4, he explains how IQ alone at best leaves 75 percent of job success unexplained. He 
continues by stating that IQ, paradoxically, has the least power in predicting success among people smart enough to 
handle the most cognitively demanding fields like engineering, law or medicine. From Goleman’s perspective, IQ 
“is just a threshold competence – you need it to get in the field, but it does not make you a star.” Competence, in this 
analysis, is a personal trait or set of traits that leads to more effective or superior job performance. These results 
appear to have a clear mapping to the integration function. When performing the integration function, the IHA 
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integrator needs to have the cognitive ability to organize the IHA plan, to reason between competing structural 
approaches, to analyze the interactions between the various systems and to perform trade-offs for decision making 
under uncertainty. Because IQ is a threshold competence, cognitive ability is a necessary requirement for an IHA 
integrator. However, it is not a sufficient requirement when viewed from a singular competence perspective. 
 
2. Necessary but not Sufficient Requirements: Expertise 
 
Practical intelligence is a combination of technical know-how and experience. Expertise, in this light, is a 
combination of common sense plus specialized knowledge or skill that is picked up while doing a job. It 
incorporates the tricks of the trade that can only be learned while in the trenches4. In relation to IQ, Robert 
Sternberg, an authority on success and intelligence, revealed that expertise contributes at least as much as IQ when it 
comes to success on the job24. As expressed in Goleman’s research, “practical intelligence is rarely the main factor 
in outstanding job performance.”  Expertise, therefore, is a baseline competence. You need it to get the job done. 
Managers and supervisors of technical workers need to have some degree of expertise in order to reasonably 
understand what their employees are doing. However, when it comes to superior performers, expertise is a threshold 
requirement because the primary ability demonstrated by outstanding managers and integrators is not technical, but 
rather related to handling people4. When performing the integration function, the IHA integrator needs to have a 
certain depth of knowledge about many technical areas that are generally only gained after years in the integration 
role. Thus, expertise is a necessary requirement for an IHA integrator. However, it is not a sufficient requirement 
when viewed from a singular competence perspective because other factors such as interaction with people are 
needed.  
 
3. Necessary but not Sufficient Requirements: Emotional Intelligence 
 
In Goleman’s research, emotional intelligence is simply the capacity for recognizing our own feelings and those 
of others, for motivating ourselves, and for managing emotions well in ourselves and in our relationships4. Though 
distinct from academic intelligence, it is best viewed as complementary to cognitive ability as measured by IQ. The 
relative importance of emotional intelligence to IQ is clearly seen in the workplace. Many book smart people who 
lack emotional intelligence end up working for people who have lower IQ’s but excel in emotional intelligence 
abilities. This statement is not intended as a judgment, but only as a general statement of what is required when 
interaction with numerous people is an integral part of the integration task. Intellect and emotions represent two 
different kinds of intelligence that express activity of different parts of the brain. The intellect is based solely on the 
workings of the neocortex (part of the cerebral cortex involved in higher functions such as sensory perception, 
generation of motor commands, spatial reasoning, conscious thought and language), the evolved layers at the top of 
the brain, while the emotional centers are lower in the brain (the limbic system). Emotional competence involves the 
emotional centers (the limbic system) at work in concert with the intellectual centers4. 
For clarification, there is a difference between emotional intelligence and emotional competence. Emotional 
intelligence determines our potential for learning practical skills that are based on five elements: self-awareness, 
motivation, self-regulation, empathy and social skills4. Emotional competence expresses how much of that potential 
we have translated into on-the-job capabilities. Just because a person is high in emotional intelligence does not 
guarantee the person will have learned the emotional competencies that matter for work. 
The significance of emotional intelligence over IQ and expertise in determining superior job performance is clear 
and convincing. Goleman’s research clearly shows that far more weight is given to emotional competence than to 
cognitive ability. Even among scientists and those in technical professions, analytical thinking ranks third after the 
ability to influence and the drive to achieve4. Influencing and achieving are components of emotional competence. 
Analysis and independent results confirm the following: emotional competence was found to be twice as important 
in contributing to excellence on-the-job compared to pure intellect and expertise4. In the US government, Goleman 
revealed that the higher the level of the job, the less important technical skills and cognitive ability were, and the 
more important competence in emotional intelligence became. 
With respect to job complexity, Goleman described research that revealed the following results: for simple jobs, 
those in the top one percent (in terms of top performers) produced three times more output than those in the bottom 
one percent; for jobs of medium complexity, a top performer was twelve times more productive than those at the 
bottom; for the most complex jobs, performers in the top one percent produced 127 percent more than average 
performers. In summary, these research results show that for those involved with high complexity jobs, like IHA 
integration, emotional intelligence is not simply additive with cognitive ability, it is multiplicative. Emotional 
intelligence is clearly the predominant ingredient in star performance on the job. 
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Given the relationship between emotional intelligence and emotional competence, it is clear that emotional 
intelligence does not guarantee a person will develop and display associated emotional competencies. Additional 
factors such as organizational climate and the person’s interest in the job also play a part to determine whether the 
competence will manifest itself. When performing the integration function, the IHA integrator needs to have 
emotional intelligence in order to reasonably select and utilize the right personnel for tasks, to increase 
communication and understanding between team members and to resolve personnel and organizational disputes. 
Despite the significance of emotional intelligence over IQ and expertise for complex jobs such as IHA, emotional 
intelligence is only a necessary requirement. It is not a sufficient requirement when viewed from a singular 
competence perspective because how the emotional intelligence is manifested in the integrator role is a major 
ingredient (among others) that is needed. 
 
4. Necessary but not Sufficient Requirements: Big Picture Thinking (Systems Perspectives) 
 
Though Goleman more than adequately revealed the relative importance of emotional intelligence over IQ and 
expertise, his research also distinguished the most significant cognitive ability with respect to star performers in 
executive and leadership positions. This cognitive ability was “big-picture” thinking. It is a form of pattern 
recognition that allows leaders to pick out meaningful trends from the deluge of surrounding information allowing 
them to think strategically far into the future4. With respect to high-performing CEOs, three clusters of competencies 
were found that distinguished them from average CEOs. The first two competencies were emotional while the third 
was cognitive, that is, strategic, conceptual, big-picture thinking. It was noticed that the greatest leaders did 
something that even the top performing leaders did not. The greatest leaders integrated their emotional realities into 
their inspiring visions allowing them to instill strategy with meaning. Even though Goleman’s research focus was on 
executive and leadership positions like CEOs and the IHA integrator role as described in this paper is a somewhat 
different type of leadership role, the authors believe that many (not all) of the results described are applicable to the 
IHA integrator. This is because the iterative nature of the IHA process involves a tumultuous amount of information 
that must be mined, refined and sifted. The ability to extract meaningful patterns from the deluge of data presented is 
a critical function found in only the best integrators. The best integrators, like the high-performing CEO’s, tend to 
incorporate the emotional realities of the organizational culture into their strategic analysis of mitigating hazards. 
Howard Gardner, the influential Harvard theorist, aptly described the cognitions of big-picture thinking in his 
book, Five Minds for the Future3. In this book, Gardner describes “the synthesizing mind3” as the ability to take 
information from disparate sources and to integrate ideas from different disciplines into a coherent whole in ways 
that make sense. This capacity, according to Gardner, will become more crucial as information continues to mount 
at dizzying rates.  
Michael Massie, present lead for Constellation’s IHA, also described this “big-picture” thinking capability when 
he discussed the type of person it takes to operate within the IHA environment. In his words, “It takes a special kind 
of thinker to wrap their head around a large scale integrated hazard analysis. Those who succeed can simultaneously 
see many parts working together on many levels.   The person, for example, who can see the quarks joined to 
become electrons which fly around in a cloud around the nucleus of the atom which is joined to other atoms to form 
a molecule which is added to other molecules to from a mixture of matter which is joined with more matter to form 
a planet which orbits a sun with moons encircling it and the sun is circumnavigating a galaxy which is part of a 
cluster which is part of a supercluster which is part of the cosmos.  The person who can see this and track it in 
his/her mind and freely shift from layer to layer is the individual who can handle the IHA of large scale integrated 
systems15.” Though big-picture thinking is significant among top performers, it is a necessary but not sufficient 
requirement for an IHA integrator. 
D. Deleterious Mindsets, Assumptions and Behaviors to Avoid 
 
In the process of performing IHA integration, there are many mindsets, assumptions and behaviors that will 
impede the integrator’s ability to safely and efficiently perform the job. Goleman, who already discussed the 
importance of emotional intelligence over IQ and expertise, also identifies behaviors that caused leaders to fail. (If 
we continue to describe the integrator as a type of leader or manager, then many of Goleman’s leadership results can 
be applied to the IHA integrator.) Two significant behaviors include rigidity and poor relationships. Rigidity is 
defined as the integrators inability to adapt their style to changes in the organizational culture. Poor relationships 
begin by being too harshly critical, insensitive or demanding. Other deleterious behaviors include work overload, 
lack of autonomy and unfairness. 
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Tavris and Aronson in their lively book, titled, Mistakes Were Made (but not by me) 2, describes the condition of 
cognitive dissonance. In their own words, “The brain is designed with blind spots, optical and psychological, and 
one of its cleverest tricks is to confer on us the comforting delusion that we, personally, do not have any. In a sense, 
dissonance theory is a theory of blind spots – of how and why people unintentionally blind themselves so that they 
fail to notice vital events and information that might make them question their behavior or their convictions2.” 
Because most of us are not self-correcting, we should endeavor to keep telling ourselves the truth, even when we 
make major mistakes. The IHA integrator will undoubtedly encounter blind spots in his/herself as well as blind spots 
in others. The dynamics of cognitive dissonance is relevant when a team member/stakeholder is obviously wrong in 
their assessment, but they choose self-justification of their beliefs instead of humility to the truth. 
E. Putting it All Together (Necessary and Sufficient): Interactive Collaborators 
 
Michael Maccoby, in his book “The Leaders We Need1”, tackled the subject of leaders and followers throughout 
time to reveal insightful characteristics of past and present-day leaders. His research parallels the organizational 
shifts through time described earlier by Professor Vicere (see figure 1). He analyzed the psychological makeup of 
leaders from old organizational control paradigms and from present-day “knowledge worker” organizations. He 
calls those stuck in old organizational behaviors “Bureaucratic Followers.” He also contrasts these individuals with a 
new type of leader called “Interactive Collaborators.” To be sure, there are some individuals who successfully 
transition from the former role to the latter. In his analysis, the Interactive Collaborator is less focused on status and 
autonomy (compared to the Bureaucratic Follower) and more focused on teamwork and self-development. Their 
strengths include their independence, the readiness for change and their quick ability to connect with others and 
work in a self-managed team. They tend not to follow autocratic, insensitive bosses who don’t listen. They are 
natural communicators and collaborators. They tend to be aware of their own transferences and generally rely on 
others (usually an outsider) to provide reality checks. In short, the Interactive Collaborator combines multiple 
capacities (emotional, strategic, big-picture thinking, etc.) into a cohesive whole in order to provide leadership to 
organizations. For this reason, Interactive Collaborators meet the condition of necessary and sufficient requirements 
for an IHA integrator. 
IV. Emotional Competence Dependency Model 
Goleman’s groundbreaking research has revealed the additive importance of emotional intelligence relative to IQ 
and expertise for regular jobs as well as its multiplicative importance when applied to highly complex jobs. If 
emotional competence is the real world application of emotional intelligence, then how can managers and human 
resource departments use Goleman’s emotional intelligence-to-competence relationships when assessing the 
emotional competencies of potential candidates in the hiring process. One suggestion is to use Goleman’s expert 
knowledge in emotional intelligence and emotional competence to develop a formal, graphical, qualitative 
dependency model that can be used in a quantitative evaluation. There would be many advantages to such a model. 
First, it could be adjusted to several types of employer contexts, that is, weights could be applied to each of the five 
dimensions of emotional intelligence (self-awareness, self-regulation, motivation, empathy and social skills) to fit 
the emotional requirements of the employer. Second, given the type of inference employed, the model can be used to 
handle uncertainty associated with partial or missing data which generally occurs in hiring situations. Third, the 
graphical representation could be used to justify the reasoning thereby clearly explaining why a candidate is hired or 
not in a consistent and unambiguous fashion. Dr. Terry Morris, a NASA researcher with expertise in commercial 
off-the-shelf (COTS) software evaluations, developed a process by which expert knowledge could be extracted and 
used formally in a comparative evaluation25. This section will be used to describe how Morris’s process can be 
adapted in developing an emotional competence dependency model. 
Dependency is a statement about a set of variables.  Saying that variables A and B are dependent on each other 
means that if the value of A is known, then information has been provided (to some extent) about the value of 
variable B.  Dependency can be conditional or unconditional, unidirectional or bidirectional, and functional or 
causal.  The type of dependency of interest in this analysis is causal pair wise conditional dependency.  Dependency 
models, as used in this analysis, are sets of dependency statements.  Formally, a dependency model is a pair M = (U, 
I), where U is a finite set of elements or variables, and I(.,.|.) is a rule that assigns truth values to a three place 
predicate whose arguments are disjoint subsets of U. The interpretation of the conditional independence assertion 
I(X, Y | Z) is that having observed Z, no additional information about X could be obtained by also observing Y. In a 
probabilistic model, I(X, Y | Z) holds if and only if 
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( ) ( )zxPyzxP |,| =  whenever ( ) 0| >yzP          (1) 
 
for every instantiation x, y and z of the sets of variables X, Y and Z.  
A graphical representation of a dependency model M = (U, I) is a direct correspondence between the elements in 
U and the set of nodes in a given graph, G, such that the topology of G reflects the independence assertions of I. 
There are different kinds of graphical models.  The most common are undirected graphs (Markov networks) and 
directed graphs (Bayesian networks). Each one has its own merits and shortcomings. These graphical models are 
knowledge representation tools used by an increasing number of scientists and researchers.  The reason for the 
extended success of graphical models is their capacity to represent complexity and to handle independence 
relationships, which has proved crucial for the storage of information.  The graphical models used in this paper will 
be restricted to Bayesian networks. 
Graphical models that represent directed dependencies are known as Bayesian networks and they result in a 
powerful knowledge representation formalism based on probability theory.  Bayesian networks are graphical models 
where the nodes represent random variables, the arcs signify the existence of direct causal influences between the 
variables, and the strengths of these influences are expressed by forward conditional probabilities28.  Formally, a 
Bayesian network is a pair, B = (G, P), defined by a set of variables X = (X1,…,Xn), where G is a directed acyclic 
graph (DAG) defining a model M of conditional dependencies among the elements of X,  
 ( ) ( )( )nP ππ |,...,| 1 n1 xpxp=                (2)  
 is a set of n conditional probability distributions (CPDs), one for each variable, and iπ  is the set of parents of node  
Xi in G.  The set P encodes the conditional independence assumptions of G to induce a factorization of the joint 
probability distribution (JPD) as  
( ) ( )∏
=
=
n
i
i
1
|πixpxp .              (3) 
 When the random variables are discreet, as used in this analysis, the types of distribution applied to each variable 
will be multinomial, thereby describing a multinomial Bayesian network.  In multinomial Bayesian networks, all 
variables in X are discrete, that is, each variable has a finite set of possible values.  An advantage of Bayesian 
networks is its natural perception of causal influences thus making it an unambiguous representation of dependency.  
This is useful for the emotional competence evaluation problem in that it allows for the explicit identification of 
influences between attributes of each potential candidate.  Moreover, the Bayesian network’s requirement of strict 
positivity allows it to serve as an inference instrument for logical and functional dependencies.  Furthermore, its 
ability to quantify the influences with local, conceptually meaningful parameters allows it to serve as a globally 
consistent knowledge base. In this way, Bayesian networks are natural tools for dealing with uncertainty and 
complexity.  Characterizations of these networks generally involve determining whether the structure of the model is 
known and whether the data is complete. Bayesian models (when the structure is unknown) may be constructed 
from prior knowledge, conditional independence statements (CIS), data, or some hybrid of the above.  Prior 
knowledge may include distinct knowledge of a problem domain as well as input from experts.  As used in this 
analysis, Bayesian networks, B = (G, P), are graphical and mathematical models that represent the dependency and 
probabilistic structure between a set of variables. They can be used intuitively as a knowledge base for a set of 
variables where G (dependency structure) is the structural component and P (the probabilistic structure) is the more 
quantitative component.  The dependency structure (G) of the emotional competence Bayesian network will be 
extracted from domain expert, Daniel Goleman. The term probability model refers to a complete specification of the 
JPD over a set of variables.  Therefore, the terms probability model and JPD are used interchangeably.  The JPD 
contains structural as well as quantitative information about the relationships among the variables.  We will use the 
term dependency model to refer only to the causal structure of the relationships among a set of variables. The 
emotional competence dependency model extraction process described here will be a modified version of the one 
Morris used for COTS software evaluation. This extraction process will describe the transformation procedure that 
maps the emotional competence dependency structure to a graphical representation of that structure as a dependency 
model.   
The extraction process starts by identifying emotional intelligence and emotional competence relational/causal 
phrases that define expert-revealed relationships. Causal relations can generally be identified by scanning for the 
following words: ‘affects’, ‘influences’, ‘is crucial for’, ‘contributes to’, etc.  Generally, when no causal relation can 
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be identified, the attribute/variable/node is considered independent.  The following phrases were identified in 
Goleman’s book, Working With Emotional Intelligence4: 
 
1) Note 1 Î there are five dimensions of emotional intelligence (self-awareness, self-regulation, 
motivation, empathy and social skills) 
2) Note 2 Î The emotional competencies cluster into groups, each based on a common underlying 
emotional intelligence capacity 
3) Causal phrase 1 Î self-awareness influences emotional awareness, accurate self-assessment and self-
confidence 
4) Causal phrase 2 Î self-regulation influences self-control, trustworthiness, conscientiousness, 
adaptability and innovation 
5) Causal phrase 3 Î motivation influences achievement drive, commitment, initiative and optimism 
6) Causal phrase 4 Î empathy influences understanding others, developing others, service orientation, 
leveraging diversity and political awareness 
7) Causal phrase 5 Î social skills influence communication, influence, conflict management, leadership, 
change catalyst, building bonds, collaboration and cooperation and team capabilities 
8) Causal phrase 6 Î self-awareness is crucial for self-regulation and empathy 
9) Causal phrase 7 Î self-regulation and self-awareness contribute to motivation 
10) Causal phrase 8 Î self-awareness, self-regulation, motivation and empathy are at work in social skills 
 
Where possible, each causal relation was translated into a conditional independence statement and gathered into 
a causal list. When X and Y are conditionally independent given Z, we write I(X, Y | Z).  The statement I(X, Y | Z) is 
referred to as a CIS.  This statement conveys the idea that once Z is known, knowing Y can no longer influence the 
probability of X.  A good way to translate a causal relation to a CIS is by the use of the form 
( ) n1,...,i   XI i =,|, iπφ                                          (4) 
where X = (X1,…,Xn)  represents the set of attribute nodes and iπ represents the set of parents that influence Xi.  
Table 1 displays the CIS for each emotional competence causal phrase described by Goleman.  After reconciling any 
conflicting or missing causal relationships, structural forms of CPDs can be generated and aggregated to form the 
JPD structure. Each CIS implies a conditional probability distribution of the form 
( ) ( ) n1,...,i   XpXI ii =⇔ ii ππφ ||,               (5) 
The CPD and graphical CPD representation for each CIS in Table 1 is shown in Table 2.   
Table 1. Causal List for Emotional Competence Relationships. 
Causal Phrase CIS 
1 (self_aware Î em_aware, 
acc_self_ass, self_conf) 
( )self_aware|  self_conf, ss,acc_self_a em_aware,I φ  
2 (self_reg Î self_ctl, trust, 
consc, adapt, innov) 
( )self_reg|  innov, adapt, consc,  trust,self_ctl,I φ  
3 (motiv Î ach_drive, 
commit, init, optim) 
( )motiv|  optim, init, commit, ach_drive,I φ  
4 (emp Î under_oth, 
dev_oth, serv_ori, lev_div, 
pol_aware) 
( )emp|  pol_aware, lev_div, serv_ori, dev_oth, under_oth,I φ  
5 (soc_skills Î comm, infl, 
con_mgmt, lead, ch_cat, bb, 
cc, team_cap) 
( )soc_skills|   team_cap,cc, bb, ch_cat, lead, con_mgmt, infl, comm,I φ
 
6 (self_aware Î self_reg, 
emp) 
( )self_aware|  emp, self_reg,I φ  
7 (self_reg, self_aware Î 
motiv) 
( )self_aware self_reg,|  motiv,I φ  
8 (self_aware, self_reg, 
motiv, emp Î soc_skills) 
( )emp motiv, self_reg, ,self_aware|  ,soc_skillsI φ  
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Table 2. CPDs  and Graphical CPD Representations for Emotional Competence Relationships. 
Causal 
Phrase 
CPD Graphical CPD Representation 
1 
 
)self_aware|self_conf    
 ss,acc_self_a ,p(em_aware
 
 
2 
 
self_reg)|innov adapt,   
 consc,  trust,,p(self_ctl
 
 
3 
 
motiv)|optim init,   
 commit, e,p(ach_driv
 
 
4 
 
 
emp)|pol_aware lev_div,   
 serv_ori, dev_oth, h,p(under_ot
 
 
5 
 
 
)soc_skills| team_capcc, bb, ch_cat,
 lead, con_mgmt, infl, p(comm,
 
 
6 
 ( )self_aware|emp self_reg,p  
 
7 
 ( )self_aware self_reg,|motivp  
 
8 
 
emp) motiv,   
 self_reg, ,self_aware|lsp(soc_skil
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Figure 5. Emotional Competence Dependency Model. 
Aggregation of all of the CPDs forms the causal structure of the following joint probability distribution using the 
factorization in equation (3): 
 ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )motiv|optim init, commit, ach_drive,          
self_reg|innov adapt, consc,  trust,self_ctl,          
self_aware|self_conf ss,acc_self_a em_aware,          
emp|pol_aware lev_div, serv_ori, dev_oth, under_oth,          
soc_skills| team_capcc, bb, ch_cat, lead, con_mgmt, infl, comm,          
self_aware self_reg,|motivself_aware|emp self_reg,          
emp motiv, self_reg, ,self_aware|soc_skills
p
p
p
p
p
pp
pJPD =
                  (6) 
 
Representing the JPD graphically allowing only one node for each emotional competence reveals the emotional 
competence dependency model in figure 5. This formal model incorporates all the emotional intelligence domain 
knowledge described by Goleman. Using Bayesian analysis, this dependency model can be tailored and used by 
managers and human resource personnel in a quantitative evaluation model used for hiring. Weights can be adjusted 
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and applied to each emotional intelligence dimension depending on the emotional competence hiring requirements, 
the organizational culture and the complexity of the job. The model also provides for clear justification as to why a 
candidate was hired or not and the justification can be viewed graphically providing for clarity and consistency of 
hiring decisions. 
V. Conclusion 
Organizations are evolving and thus the role and qualifications of integrators must also evolve to reflect the 
unique nature and characteristics of today’s complex systems. IHA integrators must acknowledge the need to evolve 
since our organizations are moving from hierarchical structures based on control to network-enabled structures 
based on relationships. External requirements for IHA integrators were extracted from space shuttle accidents 
reports. Given that organizational factors weigh as much or more to safety and hardware selection or software 
development, necessary and sufficient requirements were analyzed using various experts in comparative human 
functioning and leadership. In the process of analyzing internal requirements, that is, from psychological 
perspectives, a dependency model was revealed that may be beneficial in IHA integrator hiring.  
 
References 
1Maccoby, Michael, The Leaders We Need: and What Makes Us Follow, Harvard Business School Press, Publishing, Boston, 
MA, 2007. 
2Tavris, Carol, and Aronson, Elliot, Mistakes Were Made (But Not by Me): Why We Justify Foolish Beliefs, Bad Decisions, 
and Hurtful Acts, Harcourt Publishing Company, Orlando, FL, 2007. 
3Gardner, Howard, Five Minds for the Future, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA, 2006. 
4Goleman, Daniel, Working with Emotional Intelligence, Bantam Books, New York, NY, 1998.  
5Leveson, Nancy G. and Cutcher-Gershenfeld, Joel, What System Safety Engineering Can learn from the Columbia Accident, 
NASA Ames Grant, NAG2-1543, MIT, Cambridge, MA. 
6Leveson, Nancy G., Technical and Managerial Factors in the NASA Challenger and Columbia Losses: Looking Forward to 
the Future, MIT, Cambridge, MA.  
7Vicere, Albert A., “Leadership and the Networked Economy,” Journal of Human Resource Planning, Volume 25, 2002.  
8Hamel, G. and Prahalad, C. K., Competing for the Future, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA, 1994.  
9Vicere Associates, Inc., Web address: http://www.vicere.com.  
10Bar-Yam, Y., “When Systems Engineering Fails --- Toward Complex Systems Engineering,” IEEE International 
Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Volume 2, October 2003.  
11New England Complex Systems Institute, Web address: http://necsi.edu 
12System of Systems Engineering Center of Excellence, Web address: http://www.sosece.org 
13Reuger, A. “Local Theories of Causation and the A Posteriori Identification of the Causal Relation,” Erkenntnis, Volume 
48: 25-38, 1998. 
14CxP 70003, Constellation Program Plan, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, DC. July 2008.  
15Massie, M. J., “Constellation Integrated Hazard Analysis – Overcoming the Challenges,” Third IAASS Conference, Rome, 
Italy, October 2008.  
16Sheard, S. A., “Twelve Systems Engineering Roles,” Proceedings of the INCOSE Sixth Annual International Symposium, 
Boston, MA, 1996.  
17Gibson, J. E., How to do a Systems Analysis and Systems Analyst Decalog, Ivy, Virginia, July 1991.  
18Rogers, W. P. (chair), Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, US Government 
Accounting Office, Washington, DC., 1986.  
19Gehman, H. (chair), Columbia Accident Investigation Report, US Government Accounting Office, Washington, DC., 
August 2003.  
20Center for Neural Skills; http://www.neuroskills.com/brain.shtml  
21Teen Drug Abuse; http://teens.drugabuse.gov/mom/mom_opi5.php  
22Goleman, Daniel, Emotional Intelligence, Bantam Books, New York, NY, 1995.  
23Vedantam, Shankar, “Brain Development and Intelligence Linked, Study Says,” Washington Post, March 30, 2006.  
24Wagner, R. K, and Sternberg, R. J., “Practical Intelligence in Real-World Pursuits: The Role of Tacit Knowledge,” Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, Volume 49, 1985.  
25Morris, A. T., and Beling, P. A., “Extracting Acyclic Dependency Models from Quality Standards for COTS Software 
Evaluation ,” AIAA 1st Intelligent Systems Technical Conference, Chicago, Illinois, Sep. 20-22, 2004. 
26Bennis, W. and Goldsmith, D., Learning to Lead, Massachusetts: Persus Book, 1997. 
 
 
